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ABSTRACT: It is not uncommon, in argumentation and in various professions, to diagnose a gap between 
theory and practice; and in the next step argue that they should be brought into line with each other. But 
what does this mean? I shall argue that some version of a gap is sound, as it leaves theory with a critical, 
independent role in relation to practice—something that an equilibrium view does not.  
 





All professions have what is generally termed a theory-practice problem. But what does 
this problem consists in? Not unsurprisingly, answers to that question differ widely. 
Theoreticians might complain that practitioners do not use available scientific, research-
based knowledge in their work, but rather rely on common sense and old bags of tricks. 
Practitioners frequently complain that research-based, theoretical knowledge is too 
abstract and general to be of any use in practical contexts; often with the additional 
complaint that the theory produced by theoreticians simply is not relevant; it does not 
address the issues that practitioners are interested in. Sometimes it is claimed that practice 
is self-sufficient, it does not need theory. And occasionally it is claimed that theory 
pursuit is an end in itself, free of practical concerns. 
 Even a discipline such as argumentation has a theory-practice problem. In this 
paper I shall discuss a selection of aspects of the theory-practice problem. First, I shall 
look into how the problem has been diagnosed; namely as consisting in a gap between 
theory and practice. Second, I inquire into a way of thinking that treats theory and 
practice as more of an “equilibrium,” that is, where there is no gap. I shall argue that 
some version of a gap is a sound way of understanding the relationship, if theory is to 
keep its critical potential and preserve a dignity in its own right.       
 
2. GAPS AND THEIR REMEDY 
 
In his seminal work The Uses of Argument (1958/2003) Stephen Toulmin diagnoses a gap 
between logical theory and critical practice. The gap seems to come down to a mismatch 
between theory and practice. The problem, in Toulmin’s view, stems from the ambition 
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to cast logic in a geometrical or mathematical form, and from the insistence that all 
arguments can be treated as analytical arguments. This theory does not accommodate 
actual practice. Much of his book, as I read it, is devoted to showing that while formal 
logic nicely fits analytical arguments, it does not fit substantial arguments and judgments. 
Attempts at moulding all types of arguments in an analytical cast will do violence to the 
non-analytical types of argument. Substantial arguments need fresh categories, Toulmin 
argues. The traditional, geometrical way of looking at arguments, as premises and 
inference to a necessary conclusion, is inadequate and needs to be revised. Toward the 
end of his book he concludes that a  
 
radical re-ordering of logical theory is needed in order to bring it more nearly into line with critical 
practice, and our justification will come only if the distinctions and objections insisted on here will 
bring such a re-ordering nearer (1958/2003, p. 234).  
 
His own work can be viewed as an attempt at providing precisely that, i.e. a new, 
different form of argument structure that would fit what we actually do when we produce 
arguments or assess judgments. And of course, much has happened in the field of logical 
theory (argumentation theory) since the book first came out.  
 Nevertheless, in 2000 Ralph Johnson, in his book Manifest Rationality, makes the 
same diagnosis: there is a gap between theory and practice in the field of argumentation. 
There is (still) a difference between what we do and what we think, to put it crudely. In 
commenting on Toulmin’s suggestion that a radical re-ordering of theory is needed, 
Johnson remarks that a possible remedy might also be to bring practice into line with 
theory. However, his own proposed remedy is very similar to Toulmin’s: “[…] the gap 
can only be bridged by significant alterations to the theory” (2000, p. 358). 
Here we could naturally ask just how radical a re-ordering or how significant an 
alteration of theory we should opt for. In his Introduction, Toulmin defines his own 
project in a rather radical fashion:  
 
In tackling our main problems about the assessment of arguments, it will be worthwhile clearing 
our minds of ideas derived from existing logical theory and seeing by direct introspection what are 
the categories in terms of which we actually express our assessment, and what precisely they mean 
to us (p. 6).  
 
But as Johnson (2005) observes, Toulmin in fact retained many elements of the 
mathematical argument model he rejected and wanted to replace, such as ‘logical form,’ 
‘logical possibility’ and ‘validity.’ New ways of thinking generally owe some debt to 
existing theory. The re-ordering cannot be all that radical, Johnson argues, because we 
cannot wipe the slate completely clean, banish all existing terms and invent brand new 
categories. 
 I am not going to discuss the question of how the theory should be revised. 
Rather, I wish to ask two other questions: First, what is means to claim that there exists a 
gap between theory and practice; and second, why theory and practice need to be brought 
into line. What do we stand to gain by such a move?  
 Gap (or gulf, as Toulmin occasionally calls it) is a metaphor that immediately 
invokes another metaphor; that of a bridge. If there is a gap between two (or more) things 
that we think should hang together, we naturally want to remedy the gap and this is 
generally thought of as building a bridge across it. What does this tell us about the 
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conceptions of theory and practice that are at play? At the outset, the metaphors of gap 
and bridge make theory and practice seem like two completely separate entities. Do they 
indicate that theory is theoretical and that practice is theory-free? And what kind of entity 
might a bridge be? A third kind of entity, unlike theory and practice, that is needed to 
build connections between them?  
 At this point we need to start looking into the question of what a theory is. I do not 
propose a full-fledged discussion of the concept of a theory here, but I do wish to make a 
distinction concerning the use of the term. This distinction is not perfect, but it does have 
a bearing on the theory-practice problem. It is the distinction between “strong” and 
“weak” notions of theory. A strong use of the term theory would be to insist that it is a 
well articulated theory dealing with a carefully delineated aspect of the world. 
Incidentally, the strong notion is what Robert Pinto, in reflective hindsight, found that his 
theoretical efforts have not satisfied or lived up to (Pinto 2001). He makes the judgment 
that while his ideas were both valid and important, they did not “add up to the elaboration 
of a theory” (p. 128), rather, they were fragmented and incomplete.  
 A weaker sense of theory (or theoretical) is what we find in claims, views and 
beliefs that clearly go beyond the observational, both concerning terms and assumptions, 
but which fall short of explicit articulation. Most claims about everyday events and 
happenings are of this kind. Theory in the weak sense is of vital importance in the theory-
practice debate. Philosopher of education Wilfred Carr (1995), in his claims that 
educational practice is fundamentally theory-laden, relies on a weak sense of theory. This 
is analogous to Norwood Hanson’s famous thesis that all observation is theory-laden 
(Hanson 1958). There is no such thing as theory-free observation; all observation is 
shaped by the purposes and prior knowledge of the observer. While observation is not the 
same as practice, it does not seem unreasonable to construe the theory-practice 
relationship along the lines of the theory-observation relationship. Educational practice, 
Carr says, is full of more or less implicit assumptions and beliefs concerning 
unobservable entities and connections of various kinds; that is, theory in the weak sense.  
Does it make sense to say that there is a gap between theory and practice if Carr is 
right and practice is infused with (this kind of) theory? It would seem that if practice is 
never theory-free, there is no gap between theory and practice in the sense that Toulmin 
described it. The theory in a theory-laden practice will always fit the practice, since it is 
the way the practice is understood. So what might a gap mean? Several explanations are 
possible. 
Those who diagnose a gap may rather want to argue that the theory with which 
practice is laden is inadequate. If that is the case, then there is a gap in the sense that the 
theory which informs practice is not the theory we want to inform practice. We might 
wish to replace old theory, old ways of seeing, with new, allegedly better or more 
adequate theory. Alternatively, the same argument can be made, but without the 
normative overtones: the theories we advocate, which typically will be theories in the 
strong sense of the term, are out of sync with practice as it is; that is, they are misleading 
as descriptions of existing practice. This latter view I think can be ascribed to both 
Toulmin and Johnson. There is a mismatch between our espoused theory and our 
practice, and thus quite probably a mismatch between strong and weak theory. The 
problem is solved by changing the (strong) theory. We keep the practice and change the 
theory, and the gap will disappear and we will have a match between theory and practice. 
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In Johnson’s terms, the gap can only be bridged by alterations to the theory. I am 
just going to tie a few brief comments to this expression, since I believe that what 
Johnson really has in mind is the same as Toulmin: a change in theory will make it 
descriptively correct of the existing practice and provide a better, more adequate 
understanding of what we actually do. But what is a bridge? The metaphor suggests some 
kind of connection between two different entities. If we pursue this line of thought, will 
we then be left with three different entities in the proposed remedy—theory, practice and 
bridge? What might such a bridge consist of? 
  One more point needs to be made concerning the views of Toulmin and Johnson. 
Their theories are both theories in the strong sense, well articulated accounts of some 
delineated aspect of the world (the domain of argumentation). Practice can, I presume, be 
laden with theory both in the strong and the weak sense. Some parts of practice may be 
informed by carefully argued theories of argument(ation). But there will always also be 
theory in the weak sense: preconceptions, prior knowledge, misunderstandings, 
prejudices and unarticulated assumptions that shape what we see, perceive, think and do. 
It is my hypothesis that theory in the strong sense cannot hope to replace all theory in the 
weak sense in a theory-laden practice. Nor do I see why it should; an issue I shall return 
to. 
First let me look into the question of altering or re-ordering the theory to make it 
fit practice. Why should we change the theory and not the practice? Leaving aside the 
fact that changing theory is quicker and easier than changing practice, is there some tacit 
assumption here that practice is unproblematic and thus can be taken for granted, so that 
if the theory does not match it is obvious that the theory needs revision? Toulmin, as I 
read him, does not address that particular question, but it is obvious that he thinks that 
logical theory (argumentation theory), such as it was at the time he wrote the book, by no 
means accommodates critical practice and the types of arguments that people actually 
employ. The strong theory does violence to the practice. Whatever weak theory that 
might inform this practice, he does not discuss. 
Let me return to the interpretation of “gap” touched upon above; that the theory 
which informs practice is not the theory we want to inform practice. Such theory is likely 
to be weak and largely implicit. If we find this theory inadequate, is that because we also 
find the practice (somewhat) inadequate? If so, a strong theory that does not match 
practice would rather suggest that practice should be changed, not the theory. I would like 
here to briefly invoke Roger Wertheimer’s distinction between what he calls systems of 
actuality and systems of ideality (Wertheimer 1972), which has a bearing on the question 
of whether the theory or the practice should be changed if the job is to bring them into 
line. 
By system Wertheimer means a  
 
[…] more or less well organized and integrated system of laws […] concerning some more or less 
well-defined set of properties of some more or less well-defined set of objects (p. 88).  
 
A scientific theory (theory in the strong sense) is a paradigm case of a system of 
actuality; a moral code is a paradigm case of a system of ideality. Both types, he says, 
entertains the same form of laws, the difference lies in what is done with the law. A law 
is a generalization of the form “(x) (Fx  Vx),” which sustains counterfactual 
conditionals, but this definition itself is of no importance to my concerns here. Within 
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systems of ideality, writers do not intend to describe regularities in actual behaviour and 
what they say is not falsified by deviations from this regularity (or practice). Rather, a 
system of ideality describes what people do when they act in conformity with this system. 
If people do not act accordingly, we do not judge the system of ideality and its laws to be 
wrong; instead we judge the actors to be wrong in doing what they do. In such a system, 
therefore, the law is used as a basis for assessing both instances and counter-instances to 
the law. This would apply equally to rules or norms for argumentation: if we fail to live 
up to them, we are to be blamed, not the rules. Rules and norms may be criticized for 
many reasons but hardly on grounds that we fail to live up to them.         
In systems of actuality, on the other hand, the law is judged to be wrong if cases 
of deviation are discovered. In other words, the instances and counter-instances are used 
as grounds for assessing the law. Wertheimer’s characterization of systems of ideality and 
actuality may be crude and unsatisfactory, but it serves to highlight the following 
problem: is logical (argumentation) theory a system of ideality or a system of actuality? 
Is it the theory that is judged when theory and practice mismatch, or is it the practice? 
Both Toulmin and Johnson state that it is the theory. 
     
3. EQUILIBRIUM: THEORY AND PRACTICE BEING IN LINE 
 
As we have seen, Toulmin calls for a radical re-ordering of theory. All theory, he says, 
should be tested “against our actual practice of argument-assessment, rather than against 
a philosopher’s ideal” (1958/2003, p. 10). Then we shall be able to build up a picture of 
logic very different from the traditional one. Johnson (2000) concurs with this view; in 
2005 he suggests that the relationship of theory and practice better be viewed as 
reciprocal, in a Deweyan fashion. 
 But why should theory and practice be brought into line? What do we stand to 
gain by such a move? And what does it mean, exactly, for theory and practice to be in 
line? One thing that it does seem to mean for Toulmin, is that theory then would be 
descriptively correct of practice. Theory here refers to explicit, articulated logical 
(argumentation) theory. It is this theory that must be changed to fit practice. In the weak 
sense of theory, as found in the notion of theory-laden practice, theory and practice 
already hang closely together, quite possibly in a reciprocal fashion. But should theory in 
the strong sense do the same? 
 Before we delve into these questions, it is necessary to briefly address the issue of 
the function of theories—and here we speak of theory in the strong sense. What job(s) do 
we want our theory to do in relation to practice? Generally, theories are thought to 
provide descriptions, explanations and predictions of the phenomenon within their scope. 
We might add that they can also be used as instruments to modify the world, often 
expressed as theory for practice. Other suggestions might be to guide, prescribe, 
illuminate, ground, justify.  
Does the ascribed function have a bearing on how one envisions the relationship 
in terms of gaps or of being in line; and, if so, how? It is not entirely clear to me what 
Toulmin and Johnson take the function of theory to be besides what I have already hinted 
at. Robert Pinto (2001) seems to hold that ideally the job of a theory is to ground critical 
practice, but he doubts that it is at all possible to construct such a theory. He grants that 
theory might illuminate practice, though. Johnson (2005), in his discussion of Pinto’s 
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views, problematizes Pinto’s assumptions that a theory would have to be systematic and 
complete, and that the job of any theory worth the name is to provide a foundation for 
practice.   
 
3.1 Deweyan reciprocity 
 
The Deweyan picture of reciprocity—theory and practice being continually revised in 
light of each other—naturally seems attractive; a dynamic relationship that allows both 
parts to develop. Johnson (2005) explicitly suggests this as a remedy for the gap, but 
thinks that this way is not open to Toulmin because in the last analysis Toulmin tacitly 
relies on Cartesian ideas. Toulmin begins in practice. As he himself describes his 
procedure, he starts by characterizing the main concepts used in practice. That done, we 
can look at what sort of theory we might build up that could have the required kind of 
application. We should, he urges, clear our heads of existing logical theory so we can see 
by direct introspection what categories we actually use.  
 Pinto clearly also begins in practice. His overall view of the argumentation 
enterprise is that “our judgments about arguments and inference are guided by a tradition 
of critical practice rather than by an over-arching theory” (2001, p. 129). In my 
terminology, this might amount to judgments/practice being guided by the theory in the 
weak sense which informs and shapes practice. Michael Gilbert (2007) also seems to 
begin in practice in his discussion of how to build normative controls on everyday 
argument. It is a kind of natural normativity, he argues, that grows organically from 
goals, context and ethos of situations in which argumentation happens. The situation must 
be examined to understand the rules involved. If I understand him correctly, Gilbert 
thinks that natural normativity grows out of practice. This is an echo of Dewey, who 
explains the nature of logical ideas and principles as follows: 
 
Any habit is a way or a manner of action, not a particular act or deed. When it is formulated, it 
becomes, as far as it is accepted, a rule, or more generally, a principle or “law” of action. It can 
hardly be denied that there are habits of inference and that they may be formulated as rules or 
principles. (Dewey 1938/1991, p. 21) 
 
Hence, in Dewey’s view habits of inference might begin by being simply habits, but 
develop into rules. Some rules, Dewey says, may be necessary to every successful 
inferential inquiry. “Successful” means that the inquiry in the long run yields results that 
are either confirmed in further inquiry, or corrected by use of the same procedures. That 
is to say, the reciprocity of theory and practice is close-knit. In passing, it is worth noting 
that while Toulmin seemingly goes a long way in accepting such a view, e.g. in his 
insistence that all logical ideas should be tested against practice, I agree with Johnson that 
he does resist going all the way. We must, Toulmin says, distinguish between 
pathological and normal habits and practices. That is, logical ideas should not be tested 
against any critical practice. Also, the logician “is a student of proper inferring-habits and 
of rational canons of inference” (p. 4). This is a particularly interesting viewpoint, since 
it suggests that he (also) views logic as a system of ideality in Wertheimer’s 
understanding of the term, whereas many of his other viewpoints suggest he sees it more 
as a system of actuality.  
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 Ralph Johnson (2005) also opts for a reciprocal Deweyan way of understanding 
the relationship between theory and practice. Standards and rules arise out of practice and 
feed back into practice in a way that modifies practice, makes it more effective and/or 
adequate. But what kind of reciprocity is hiding here? It can be argued, it seems to me, 
that Dewey views theory as subordinate to practice. In The Quest for Certainty 
(1929/1988) he states that the value of ideas “is determined by the outcome of these 
operations. They [the values] are sound if the operations they direct give us the results 
which are required.” (p. 110) Hence, all ideas must be tested against practice; it is their 
function to contribute to change and development: “[…] all ideas are worthless except as 
they pass into actions which re-arrange and reconstruct in some way, be it little or large, 
the world in which we live” (p. 111). As Israel Scheffler (1973) comments, the function 
of theory and thought is to reconstruct practice by deliberately solving problems as they 
occur, more efficiently than stereotypical repetition and random variation could. Theory 
is widely understood as what we think and practice is widely understood as what we do. 
 How adequate is the reciprocal view of theory and practice? I shall argue that 
while much of what Dewey says is acceptable and his views have attracted a number of 
followers in many domains, there might be a price to pay for adopting his view on theory 
and practice—and it is theory that pays the price. Dewey’s basic way of thinking is 
holistic. He fervently wants to overcome dualisms, such as theory/practice, means/end 
and mind/body. In that sense he seems like a good choice for those who wish to bridge 
the gap between theory and practice. Theory arises from problems encountered in 
practice, its function is to solve these problems intelligently and thereby transform 
practice, in an ongoing process. Theory begins and ends in practice. Is this what Toulmin 
is after in a logical theory? If existing theory is completely out of sync with practice it is 
hardly of any value, Dewey tells us. It is not obvious that a radical re-ordering of such 
theory would give it the function Dewey suggests for theory, even if it became 
descriptively true of practice. Correspondence is not of interest, transformation is.  
 I would like at this point to briefly introduce the views of the German philosopher 
of education Erich Weniger (1990). In an essay originally published in 1929 he voices 
views about the theory/practice relationship in education that are highly similar to 
Dewey’s, even though Weniger is not a pragmatist. Weniger has a complex notion of 
theory. He distinguishes between three different degrees of theory; the first being an 
implicit, largely unarticulated fundamental ethical attitude of educational responsibility. 
A theory of the second degree is comprised of the beliefs and knowledge that the 
practitioner possesses, and which he/she can employ. But this is not enough. A genuine 
educational theory, Weniger claims, crucially turns on the consistency of first and second 
theory. If a discrepancy exists between the two, the resulting practice will be untrue, not 
genuine, since there is disagreement between ethical attitudes and espoused views. And 
here theory of the third degree enters the picture, to have the relation between theories of 
first and second degree in practice as its object. Such a theory presupposes an already 
theory-laden practice, and it is only valid, Weniger says, to the extent that it makes 
practice more rational, less random. That is, the theory is valid to the extent it delivers the 
required transformations of practice. 
There can be no doubt that for both Dewey and Weniger theory and practice are 
very much in line. But is this a good thing? Like Dewey’s theory, Weniger’s theory never 
gets out of practice. It proves its worth in practice. Its justification depends on its 
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practical, instrumental merits; to what degree it yields the required results. Israel 
Scheffler (1973) suggests that Dewey, in his endeavour to show that all dualisms really 
are partial views which belong together in a unified, more inclusive framework, runs the 
risk of mistaking valid distinctions for divorces, splits, sharp divisions—gaps and gulfs, if 
we like. His conception of the function of ideas (theory) is unduly narrow, Scheffler 
thinks, if the only function ideas are to have is to transform practice. In fact, Scheffler 
suggests, only simple ideas can be analyzed as instruments for transforming the world. 
Dewey also overlooks the vital importance and centrality of theoretical considerations in 
science, e.g. concerning the weighing of evidence, Scheffler says. 
 Dewey denies that we can meaningfully distinguish between descriptive and 
instrumental functions of thought. All thinking originates in problems (this is a 
generalization of the features of experimental research), and all ideas eventually feed 
back into action and practice. Even reflection concerns the functioning of knowledge, 
Scheffler points out. This is remarkably like Weniger, although Weniger addresses 
educational thinking in particular and does not presume to speak in general terms. But not 
even educational theories are assessed solely in terms of how they pass into action; they 
are judged in theoretical terms using time-honoured criteria such as clarity, internal 
consistency and empirical adequacy. A theory that is preoccupied with justifying itself as 
effective in practice may not have the requisite distance from practice to serve as a 
critical tool.  
 Finally I would like to suggest that while some theories within a field or domain, 
such as argumentation or education, might well be thought of as arising from practice and 
going back into practice, we should not demand this of all theories (in the strong version 
of theory). It amounts to imposing an unnecessary restraint on theories. The theories of a 
given domain may have different functions, and besides, theory as an academic pursuit 
should be regarded as  worthwhile in itself.  
  
3.2 Goodmanian balance   
 
Nelson Goodman (1983) provides a different way of bringing theory and practice into 
line. The “being in line” in this case is not a question of reciprocity, but of balance or 
equilibrium. Granted, Goodman specifically talks about justification, but I will apply his 
views to theory and practice in general. The basic idea is that theory and practice justify 
each other when brought into an equilibrium. As he himself puts it, 
 
How do we justify a deduction? Plainly, by showing that it conforms to the general rules of 
deductive inference. An argument that so conforms, is justified or valid, even if its conclusion 
happens to be false. […] Yet, of course, the rules themselves must eventually be justified. The 
validity of a deduction depends not upon conformity to any purely arbitrary rules we may contrive, 
but upon conformity to valid rules. […] But how is the validity of rules to be determined? […] 
Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive 
practice. (1983, p. 63) 
 
Goodman then admits that this looks flagrantly circular: 
 
I have said that deductive inferences are justified by their conformity to valid general rules, and 
that general rules are justified by their conformity to valid inferences. But the circle is a virtuous 
one. The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into 
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agreement with each other. […] The process of justification is the delicate one of making mutual 
adjustments between rules and accepted inferences, and in the agreement achieved lies the only 
justification needed for either. (p. 64) 
 
 If theory and practice exhibit this kind of balance or equilibrium, they have clearly 
been brought in line. So can this form of “being in line” be what Toulmin and Johnson 
are looking for? As Hilary Putnam points out in his foreword to Goodman’s book, Dewey 
would also regard this circle as virtuous (Putnam 1983). One might perhaps say that 
Goodman pictures the relationship as static, kept in balance, whereas Dewey sees it as 
continuous change. In Toulmin’s case; if theory is re-ordered so that it is brought into line 
with practice, then they would mutually justify each other. Theory is justified if it 
conforms to practice, and practice is justified if it conforms to theory. I see nothing in 
Toulmin’s text, however, to suggest that this is what he wants. 
 It should be remembered here that for Goodman, the problem of justifying rules is 
tantamount to showing that they are valid. A rule is valid if it accords with established 
practice, if it accurately codifies that practice. An unjustified, invalid rule fails to describe 
practice. But this is problematic, Harvey Siegel argues (Siegel 1992). In fact, he claims, 
codification of practice is neither necessary nor sufficient for the justification and validity 
of inferential rules. Modus ponens, for example, is a rule that is justified and valid, but it 
fails to codify inferential practice since people do not reason in accordance with it. 
Accordance with practice is thus not necessary for the validity of rules. On Goodman’s 
view, the rule is invalid, unjustified. Furthermore, Siegel argues, many people do infer in 
accordance with the principle of hasty generalization, despite the fact that it is an invalid, 
unjustified principle. Thus, accordance with practice is not sufficient for the validity and 
justification of inferential principles. Goodman, for his part, would be forced to say that 
the principle is valid, since it does codify practice. The basic question, Siegel says, is why 
we should think that a balance would serve to justify either. 
 If any two entities are in a balance of the kind Goodman envisions, then it should 
not matter where one begins to investigate inferential rules and practice and the 
relationship between them. But just like the Deweyan reciprocity discussed above seemed 
to have a certain bias in favour of practice, so does the Goodmanian balance. Practice 
takes precedence. Putnam, in his foreword, makes this very clear: 
 
Few philosophers are less aprioristic than Goodman. What he insists upon, and all that he insists 
upon in this connection, is that any proposed solution be judged by its ability to systematize what 
we actually do. (1983, p. xiii) 
 
 Goodman, Putnam says, respects formal logic but not when it describes problems 
in ways that have no pay-offs in practice. As Goodman himself expresses it,  
 
Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive 
practice. Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular deductive inferences we 
actually make and sanction. If a rule yields inacceptable inferences, we drop it as invalid. (1983, 
pp. 63-64) 
 
 As suggested above, this seems to capture what Michael Gilbert has in mind with 
his concept of natural normativity. But I think perhaps not quite. One the one hand, 
Gilbert says that the normative aspect of natural normativity arises from social pressures, 
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from others, ourselves and the situation itself. The natural aspect points to natural 
normativity arising organically from the three core elements of goals, context and ethos. 
This I have interpreted as suggesting that Gilbert thinks that norms and rules grow out of 
practice in the Deweyan sense delineated above. But on the other hand Gilbert also says 
that he is trying to build a foundation for normative controls on everyday argument (p. 
154); and the idea of a foundation is not compatible with a Deweyan perspective; nor, it 
seems, with a Goodmanian one. Gilbert also insists that rules must be grounded; in fact 
he thinks that “the issue of how we ground the rules of argument is the biggest issue we 
face” (2007, p. 150). In turn this leads to the problem of how rules that ought to be 
followed can be so grounded that they must be followed. This evidently normative 
problem is very different from Goodman’s view, which states that rules are valid if they 
conform to and systematize practice.     
 Before I return to the role of practice envisioned in the Goodmanian equilibrium, 
let me stay a little with the idea of grounding. I admit to finding it difficult to understand. 
Gilbert speaks of the need to ground rules. Pinto doubts the possibility that a theory might 
ground practice and instead holds that “our judgments about arguments and inference are 
guided by a tradition of critical practice” (2001, p. 129). But what does ground mean? It 
might mean justify, so that rules which ought to be followed must be justified—by 
theoretical arguments, perhaps.  
 But ground can also be given a more pragmatic interpretation. It may be argued 
that both Goodman and Dewey see rules (theory) as grounded in practice, in the sense 
that they begin in practice, return to practice, and are valid in so far as they serve to 
systematize practice. Thus, practice might be said to ground a rule if, as Dewey indicates, 
the rule in the long run yields the required results. If the rule yields unacceptable results, 
as Goodman says, then it is not grounded in practice, it does not conform to practice. 
People might conceivably disagree as to what the required, acceptable results are, and 
hence as to what rules are actually grounded in practice. It is not clear to me if Gilbert 
and Pinto have this pragmatic sense of ground in mind.  
 Let me return to the role of practice in Goodman’s thought. Why should we regard 
systematization of practice as central to the justification of inferential rules? Why should 
we think that fit with practice confers validity to rules and, by extension, to theory? The 
answer, Siegel argues, is that we should not think so. In sum, he says, “practice affords no 
justification to principles which fit it. The reason it does not is simple: inferential practice 
itself stands in need of justification” (1992, p. 36). All practice is, as a matter of principle, 
open to critique and challenge. Practice, therefore, should not be given such a status. 
Siegel then takes these views into a discussion of justification, and concludes in the end 
that justification by balance or equilibrium fails as an account of justification. For my 
purposes here, I should like to conclude that while the Goodmanian balance brings theory 
and practice into line, is also makes theory completely dependent on practice, for its 
existence, its application and its justification. And with no distance between theory and 
practice, theory cannot provide new perspectives, new ways of seeing, contributions to 
the development of practice, or criticism of existing practice—all of which I think theory 





THEORY AND PRACTICE 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
I have in this paper discussed the theory/practice relationship in the field of 
argumentation. My point of departure was the diagnosis offered by both Stephen Toulmin 
and Ralph Johnson of a gap between theory and practice, and the resulting need to bridge 
it. Next I discussed two possible ways of bridging the gap; one stemming from John 
Dewey, the other from Nelson Goodman. 
 It is important in this discussion to distinguish between theory in weak and strong 
sense. There is always weak theory in the form of preconceptions, prior beliefs, 
prejudices, etc. in practice; shaping and guiding it. The gap is between practice and 
theory in the strong sense; i.e. well articulated theory dealing with some carefully 
delineated aspect of the world; typically the kind of theory that researchers try to develop. 
It is this kind of theory that Toulmin and Johnson have in mind, and that they think 
should be brought into line with practice. I, on the other hand, think that while theory in 
the weak sense may be inseparable from practice, theory in the strong sense should keep 
its distance from practice.  
 What is wrong with gaps? It seems to me that a gap is taken to be a mismatch 
between theory and practice. What would happen if we re-ordered theory such that it was 
brought into line with practice? Obviously theory would become more descriptively 
correct of practice. Of course I have nothing against some theory being brought into line; 
I just think that some theory should be left at a distance from practice or be left free of 
practice altogether. This depends on what function one thinks theory should have. If one 
thinks it should describe, illuminate or perhaps prescribe practice, in much the same way 
as weak theory does, then a gap is a problem. But if one thinks that theory should provide 
other ways of understanding practice, critical views of practice etc., then it seems to me 
that some form of a gap is needed. And if one thinks, as I do, that theory also is a 
worthwhile academic pursuit in itself, free of all allusions to practice, then all theory 
should not be brought into line with practice. 
 I see two major problems with the forms of theory and practice “being in line” 
that I have discussed here. The first is that all theory, regardless of the different functions 
they may perform, is depicted as entering into one kind of relationship with practice. No 
theory is left out of this relationship; Dewey explicitly states that ideas are worthless 
unless they pass into action and contribute to the development of practice. There is no 
theory for theory’s own sake. The second problem is that theory is subordinated to 
practice. This problem is twofold. Firstly, theories must justify themselves in practice, 
they must prove their worth in practice, and they never get out of practice. Weniger’s 
view is a case in point. Secondly, practice itself seems to be taken for granted. It needs no 
justification, it just is what it is. I do not know if Toulmin and Johnson would find these 
consequences of bringing theory and practice into line acceptable; my guess is they 
wouldn’t, despite the fact that they agree that it is theory that needs to change to bridge 
the gap, not practice. 
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